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Abstract 
 
This paper employs fifteen dynamic macroeconomic models maintained within the European 
System of Central Banks to assess the size of fiscal multipliers in European countries. Using a set 
of common simulations, we consider transitory and permanent shocks to government expenditures 
and different taxes. We investigate how the baseline multipliers change when monetary policy is 
transitorily constrained by the zero nominal interest rate bound, certain crisis-related structural 
features of the economy such as the share of liquidity-constrained households change, and the 
endogenous fiscal rule that ensures fiscal sustainability in the long run is specified in terms of labour 
income taxes instead of lump-sum taxes. 
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I. Introduction 
Fiscal multipliers vary in many dimensions, as highlighted by the recent 
academic literature. The disagreement over the size of fiscal multipliers over 
the last years has not yet been resolved despite voluminous empirical and 
theoretical analyses of the issue.  
This article provides a quantitative assessment of the key factors that 
determine the GDP effects associated with the use of alternative fiscal 
instruments. We employ structural macroeconomic models maintained within 
the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) to document by means of 
simulations how multipliers depend on the fiscal instruments, the zero lower 
bound (ZLB) on the monetary policy rate, the duration of the fiscal shock and 
various country-specific features. In each of the simulated scenarios, we 
consider the short and – if applicable – the long-run effects of a discretionary 
change in a single fiscal policy instrument on real GDP. The change in the 
policy instrument amounts to 1% of baseline GDP and represents a tightening 
of the fiscal stance. Specifically, we consider a reduction in (unproductive) 
government consumption and increases in the households' labour income tax 
rate, the capital income tax rate and the consumption tax rate.   
The multipliers are computed assuming that monetary policy is either 
determined by an endogenous Taylor-type nominal interest rate rule, or 
alternatively, that interest rates are fixed for a period of two years, which we 
take as mimicking a binding ZLB condition. 
The key findings from our simulations can be summarized as follows. First, 
short-run multipliers are in general negative and smaller than one in absolute 
value. This result is quite robust with respect to the fiscal instrument, the 
considered country and the duration of the fiscal shock. Short-run tax (labour, 
consumption and capital) multipliers are typically smaller in absolute value 
than government consumption multipliers.  
Second, imposing the ZLB to bind for two years does not greatly affect short-
run multipliers associated with a temporary fiscal tightening of individual euro 
area countries. The reason is that the monetary policy rate stays essentially at 
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its baseline level even when the monetary authority is free to adjust it, 
reflecting the limited impact of a country-specific fiscal shock on the euro area 
economy. In contrast, the ZLB unfolds quite sizeable effects on the size of 
multipliers if the fiscal shocks are simultaneously implemented in the euro 
area as a whole. In particular, short-run government consumption multipliers 
become larger than one. The same holds true for non-euro area countries in 
which monetary policy is determined domestically.  
Third, the short and the long-run effects of permanent fiscal shocks depend 
on the fiscal instrument that reacts endogenously to stabilise public debt in the 
long run. Long-run multipliers are in general negative when the budgetary 
room materialising after the fiscal tightening is used to reduce lump-sum 
taxes. Instead, long-run multipliers are typically positive if the households' 
labour income tax rate is reduced in the medium to long term. Since 
households anticipate these long-run GDP effects at the outset of the 
simulations, short-run multipliers tend to be more favourable if distortionary 
taxes are used to stabilise public debt.  
Our paper is related to a small set of studies that examine the robustness of 
fiscal multiplier estimates across structural models. Cwik and Wieland (2011) 
use five macroeconomic models to estimate multipliers associated with the 
European Economic Recovery Plan and related national fiscal policy 
measures in the euro area. They focus on the announced government 
purchases component of the plan for 2009 and 2010. In the majority of 
models, private consumption and investment are crowded out by the rise in 
government spending unless the zero nominal interest rate bound is 
anticipated to be binding for at least two years. Unlike our paper, they do not 
consider tax policies. Coenen at al. (2012) employ seven dynamic stochastic 
general equilibrium models maintained by policymaking institutions to assess 
the GDP effects of discretionary fiscal stimulus shocks to seven different 
instruments. They find that fiscal stimulus is most effective if it is temporary 
and accompanied by an accommodative monetary policy stance. Unlike our 
paper, they do not focus on European countries. We should also emphasise 
that both studies investigate multipliers associated with expansionary fiscal 
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shocks whereas we consider fiscal retrenchments. The sign of the fiscal 
shocks matter in particular in those situations where the economy is at the 
zero lower bound.   
More broadly, our paper is related to a large and growing set of studies that 
examine the size of fiscal multipliers within one or two macroeconomic 
models. Prominent recent examples include Cogan et al. (2010), Christiano et 
al. (2011), Eggertsson (2011) and Woodford (2011). 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  Section II summarizes 
the models used in the simulation exercises. Section III describes the 
standardised simulations and presents the results. Section IV summarizes the 
results from the sensitivity analysis. Section V compares the model-based 
results with standard fiscal multiplier estimates from the empirical literature. 
Finally, Section VI concludes.  
 
II. Model set-up 
a. General features 
We use fifteen models from National Central Banks (NCBs) and the ECB in 
the simulation exercises. Fourteen out of fifteen are New-Keynesian dynamic 
general equilibrium models, ten out of fifteen are calibrated. A complete list of 
the models is presented in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
The majority of models from NCBs of the euro area are based on multi-
country set-ups, namely those of Belgium, Estonia, France, Germany, Italy, 
Malta, Slovenia and Spain. These models exhibit a “home” country, the rest of 
the euro area (possibly subdivided) and in some cases the rest of the world. 
In these models the euro area monetary policy responds to economic 
fluctuations in the home country only proportionally to its weight in the 
monetary union. 
A second set of models comprises small open economy set-ups, with an 
exogenous rest of the euro area and/or rest of the world: Czech Republic, 
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Finland, Greece, Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden. If the corresponding 
country is part of the euro area, monetary policy is assumed to be exogenous.  
Finally, the ECB’s New Area-Wide Model (NAWM) has also been used.  It is a 
two-country model of the euro area and the United States. Monetary policy in 
both model blocks is characterized by standard nominal interest rate rules. 
Responses to fiscal shocks can be influenced by the fiscal instrument that, 
through the fiscal rule, endogenously adjusts to stabilise public debt. In the 
vast majority of the models, this fiscal instrument reacts to deviations of the 
government debt-to-GDP ratio from the target, but in a few cases the fiscal 
instrument reacts also to deviations of the public deficit or public consumption 
from its long-run target. Typically, either the labour income tax or lump-sum 
transfers are used as fiscal instrument. In some of the simulations, the choice 
of the fiscal rule has been left at the discretion of each country modelers. 
However, whenever the fiscal rule becomes critical for the results, we 
harmonized the instrument that is specified by the rule across models.  
b. Steady state values and calibration 
Key parameters and their calibration are listed in Tables A2-A4 in the 
Appendix. The models differ in various aspects.  
In terms of steady state values, the models differ significantly as regards the 
imports-to-GDP ratio, which to some extent measures the degree of openness 
of the economy. Lowest import penetration is found for Greece and largest for 
Estonia. The models differ also substantially in terms of how public 
expenditures are financed. As an example, in the German model the labour 
income tax revenues amount to 35% of GDP, while in Spain they account only 
for 7% of GDP. The steady state values of debt-to-GDP ratio vary from 0% to 
120%. The models also vary by the degree of home bias in government 
consumption. Most of the models assume full home bias, as is typical in this 
type of set-ups, and only a few feature somewhat lower home bias of around 
90%. Finally, the share of liquidity-constrained consumers, i.e. agents that 
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have at most limited ability to smooth consumption over time, varies between 
0 to 40%.  
Regarding the calibration of some key parameters, household preferences, 
investment (or capital) adjustment costs, price and wage stickiness 
(characterized by a Calvo parameter or, if the value is larger than 1, by a 
Rotemberg adjustment cost parameter) and the proportion of firms (workers) 
that index their price (wage) to inflation are quite different across models: The 
Frisch elasticity of labour supply varies from 0.50 to 11,  wage indexation from 
0 to 0.90, and investment adjustment costs from 0.20 to about 14.  
All these differences can play an important role in explaining differences in 
fiscal multipliers across the models.  
    
III. Simulation experiments and results 
a. Definition of fiscal multipliers and simulated 
scenarios 
In each of the simulation scenarios reported below, we consider the short and 
– if applicable – the long-run effects of a discretionary change in a single fiscal 
policy instrument on real GDP. The change in the policy instrument amounts 
to 1% of baseline (before shock) GDP and represents a tightening of the fiscal 
stance. Specifically, we consider a reduction in government consumption and 
increases in the labour income tax rate of households, the capital income tax 
rate and the consumption tax rate. Fiscal instruments other than the ones 
subject to discretionary change are held constant for the first two years.1 Also 
the social security contributions are held unchanged in the simulations. In the 
medium to long run, either lump-sum or labour income taxes are allowed to 
                                                 
1 In the case of the Swedish model, the fiscal rule is implicit: lump-sum transfers make sure 
that government expenditures and tax revenues are equal in every period. For the simulations 
carried out in this model, lump-sum transfers are thus allowed to adjust also in the short run. 
5
Page 9 of 46 
 
adjust according to the country-specific fiscal rules to stabilise the public debt-
to-GDP or deficit-to-GDP ratio at their target values. In the case of permanent 
fiscal shocks, the multipliers can be quite sensitive to the fiscal instrument that 
stabilises the debt or the deficit. Therefore, we conduct these simulations 
twice with each model, in one case imposing a lump-sum tax rule and in the 
other a households' labour income tax rule.2 
Monetary policy is harmonized across models, assuming that the short-term 
nominal interest rate is determined by the Taylor rule used in Gomes et al. 
(2012), where the policy rate responds to euro area-wide inflation and output 
growth.3 We also assess the role of the ZLB on the monetary policy rate for 
the fiscal multipliers, assuming that the Taylor rule is deactivated and the 
short-term nominal interest rate is held constant at its baseline level for 2 
years. 
All simulations are run under perfect foresight. Therefore, policies are fully 
anticipated by households and firms. 
We first report GDP multipliers for transitory changes in each fiscal instrument 
implemented unilaterally by a single country. Subsequently we present 
multipliers associated with permanent changes in each fiscal instrument. In 
both cases, two years after the initial shock the country-specific fiscal rule 
starts to operate, slowly bringing the debt-to-GDP ratio or deficit-to-GDP ratio 
back to its target level (the initial pre-shock level).  
 
                                                 
2 The specification of the country-specific fiscal rule has only very modest effects on 
multipliers if the fiscal shock is transitory.  
3  The rule is specified as ܴ௧ ൌ ߩܴ௧ିଵ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߩሻሾ തܴ ൅ ߠగሺߨ௧ െ ߨതሻሿ ൅ ߠ௬ܻ݃ݎ௧, where R denotes 
the policy rate, π is the annual euro area inflation rate (excluding the direct effect from 
changes in consumption taxes) and Ygr denotes quarterly euro area output growth. തܴ	is the 
equilibrium nominal interest rate and πഥ is the monetary authority’s inflation target. The 
coefficients are as follows: ρ = 0.87, 	ߨത = 1.02, ߠగ= 1.70 and ߠ௬= 0.10. 
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b. Fiscal multipliers for temporary fiscal shocks  
Government consumption  
Table 1 shows the government consumption multipliers, i.e. the response of 
GDP to a temporary change in government consumption. The latter, as a ratio 
to the baseline GDP, decreases by one percentage point for two years and 
then returns to the baseline.  
In the first case, denoted ‘No ZLB’, the ZLB is not imposed as a constraint and 
the nominal interest rate adjusts according to the Taylor rule (see footnote 9). 
In the second case, denoted ‘2 year-ZLB’, the nominal interest rate is kept 
constant during the first two years of the simulation and follows the Taylor rule 
thereafter. Similarly, all the other fiscal instruments are held constant for two 
years. The fiscal rule kicks in thereafter. 
 
– Table 1 around here – 
 
When the ZLB is not binding all multipliers are below one in absolute terms. In 
the majority of the models the first year multipliers are between 0.7 and 0.9, 
but in some cases they are lower. They are close to 0.5 in Germany, Spain, 
Czech Republic and Sweden.  
Multipliers are lower than one in absolute value because the crowding-in 
effect on private sector spending partially compensates for the reduction in 
public consumption. In the majority of models, private sector consumption and 
investment (not reported) increase, as lower public consumption increases the 
resources available for the private sector. However, the positive wealth effect, 
i.e. the reduction in the present value of future tax payments required to 
balance the government's budget, is rather small, as the fiscal retrenchment is 
temporary.  
Multipliers are lower in absolute terms in the second year than in the first year. 
The presence of adjustment costs on investment, of habit persistence in 
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consumption and of nominal wage and price rigidities makes the response of 
private spending gradual. For instance, the difference in first and second year 
multipliers is large in the case of Portugal, which features relatively large 
investment adjustment costs.   
Note that in the case of euro area countries the country-specific real interest 
rate does not greatly decrease and, hence, does not contribute significantly to 
the crowding-in of private demand. There are two reasons for this. First, the 
monetary policy rate, set at the union-wide level, is not greatly reduced after a 
shock, because each individual country has a small effect on euro area 
inflation and economic activity. Second, the response of the country-specific 
inflation rate is rather contained. In the case of Portugal, the multipliers 
increase around 10% in the first year when the model includes financial 
frictions. Along with lower aggregate demand, the price of capital decreases, 
as well as net worth. The entrepreneurial sector becomes more leveraged and 
is forced to face a higher external finance premium, which dampens 
investment. The presence of financial frictions also creates some persistence 
effects, as it takes time to rebuild lost net worth. 
The zero lower bound 
For euro area countries, multipliers are lower than one also under the ZLB 
(the only exception is France, which exhibits a multiplier slightly larger than 
one). For euro area countries other than Germany, multipliers are either 
unchanged or only slightly larger than in the case of the nominal interest rate 
reacting according to the Taylor rule. The ZLB does not greatly affect 
economic activity in the euro area, because it lasts for a relatively small (but 
plausible) number of periods (8 quarters) and the country-specific fiscal shock 
produces only small cross-country spillovers. Responses of economic activity 
and inflation in the rest of the euro area under the ZLB are muted, as in the 
case of the active Taylor rule. As such, the responses of the region-specific 
real interest rates (in the considered country and in the rest of the euro area) 
are muted and similar in both scenarios.  
8
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However, the ZLB leads to a significantly larger multiplier in the case of a 
reduction of public consumption at the euro area level, as reflected in the 
simulation results from the ECB’s NAWM. When the ZLB does not bind, the 
euro area policy rate is reduced, favouring the crowding-in of private 
spending. When it is binding, the constant nominal interest rate and the 
decrease in euro area inflation lead to a rather strong increase in the euro 
area real interest rate that depresses private spending. For similar reasons, 
multipliers become significantly larger when the ZLB binds in the case of 
Czech Republic and Sweden, reaching values that are clearly larger than one.     
 
Different taxes  
Households' labour income tax rate 
Table 2 presents the short-run GDP multipliers in case of a transitory (two-
year) increase in the households’ labour income tax rate.  
Multipliers are lower than one in absolute value and smaller than those 
associated with the reduction in government consumption. They are generally 
around 0.1 in the first year and between 0.2-0.4 in the second year. The 
increase in labour taxes has a small impact on GDP as it operates mainly 
through its effects on wealth (permanent income) and incentives to work. As 
in the case of public consumption, the wealth effect is rather small because 
the fiscal measure is transitory. Public consumption has a larger multiplier 
because it directly reduces aggregate demand.  
The impact of the labour income tax increase is larger in some of those 
models that feature strong non-Ricardian features, including a relatively high 
percentage of liquidity-constrained consumers, such as in case of Greece, 
Portugal and Czech Republic. To some extent, the size of the labour tax 
multipliers is also related to the share of labour income tax revenues-to-GDP 
and to the degree of wage indexation. For countries with a large labour 
income tax base, the multiplier tends to be smaller in absolute terms. This is 
explained by the fact that e.g. labour supply reacts to a change in the labour 
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income tax rate, whereby a change in the tax rate needs to be smaller for 
those countries with a large labour income tax base to achieve an 1% 
increase in the ratio of labour income tax revenues to GDP. Stronger wage 
indexation, in turn, makes wages more backward looking and therefore limits 
the temporary increase in wages due to the tax hike. This limits the short-run 
impact of the temporary tax hike on employment and economic activity, 
resulting in a smaller multiplier.    
 
– Table 2 around here – 
 
Unlike in the scenario prescribing a reduction in government consumption, a 
labour tax hike leads to an increase in the multiplier for the majority of 
countries when moving from the first to the second year. This reflects the 
presence of nominal and real frictions, which leads to a gradual response of 
aggregate demand to the labour income tax hike through the substitution 
effect.  
The labour income tax hike scenario also differs from the government 
consumption-based scenario in that for the majority of countries the multipliers 
are slightly smaller when the nominal interest rate is held constant for two 
years. The contained increase in inflation (associated with negative supply 
side effects of higher labour taxes) and the fixed policy rate assumption 
together result in a slight decrease in the real interest rate, partially limiting the 
decrease in aggregate demand.  One exception to the general result is 
Germany, whose multipliers are slightly larger when the monetary policy rate 
is constant. In the Portuguese case, the presence of credit market frictions 
does not change the multipliers as the effect on prices, particularly the price of 
capital, is rather muted. 
For the ZLB experiments in the Swedish model, the effects of the shocks to 
the fiscal policy instruments on the interest rate have been offset by 
anticipated monetary policy shocks and this may explain why the multipliers 
change signs under the ZLB. As discussed by Laséen and Svensson (2011) 
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and by Carlstrom, Fuerst and Paustian (2012), anticipated monetary policy 
shocks may under some circumstances have implausibly large effects on 
inflation and output. The results from the ZLB experiments with the Swedish 
model should therefore be interpreted with some caution.  
Capital income tax rate 
Table 3 shows the short-run output multipliers of a transitory (two-year) 
increase in capital income taxation. The multipliers are generally rather small, 
below 0.3 in absolute terms. The short-run response of investment to an 
increase in the capital income tax is rather gradual, because of the short-run 
adjustment costs of investment. Moreover, there is no strong incentive to 
reduce investment since the increase in the capital income tax is transitory.  
There are some exceptions. Multipliers are rather large in the case of Sweden 
and Greece. In the Greek model, the large multiplier is driven by the sizable 
reduction in the utilisation rate of capital and the price of capital that induce a 
strong negative response of output to the tax shock. In the Portuguese case, 
credit market frictions work to propagate and amplify the negative impact on 
GDP. Increasing capital income taxes directly affects entrepreneurial returns, 
increases leverage and the cost of external finance, which reduces 
investment.  
Multipliers increase slightly under the 2-year ZLB scenario. As in the previous 
simulations, the decrease in union-wide inflation and economic activity due to 
the temporary drop in the country-specific demand is rather muted for 
countries belonging to the euro area. Under standard monetary policy, the 
policy rate does not greatly change and the country-specific real interest rate 
hardly moves. Similarly, the slowdown in country-specific inflation, and hence 
the increase in the country-specific real interest rate, is small under the ZLB. 
As a result, the ZLB does not significantly amplify the negative 
macroeconomic effects of the capital income tax increase. Concerning the 
effects for Sweden, the results under the ZLB should again be interpreted with 
some caution (see the discussion of the labour income tax hike simulations 
under the ZLB). In the Portuguese case, the presence of credit market 
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frictions has a slight amplification effect on the multipliers, also creating some 
persistence effects. 
 
– Table 3 around here – 
 
Consumption tax rate 
Table 4 shows the short-run output multipliers associated with a transitory 
increase in consumption taxation. In the absence of the ZLB, all multipliers 
are below one in absolute value. The largest multiplier is equal to 0.7 and the 
smallest is equal to 0.1. These differences reflect, at least partly, differences 
in the calibration of the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution and 
consumption habit persistence.  A higher inter-temporal elasticity of 
substitution and lower habit persistence make current consumption more 
responsive to changes in consumer prices which are directly affected by the 
transitory increase in consumption taxes. Habit persistence also tends to 
increase the multiplier in the second year relative to  the first year, because 
households favour a gradual response of private consumption.  
 
– Table 4 around here – 
 
The ZLB does not change the overall picture significantly. The only exceptions 
are the euro area and Sweden. In the case of the euro area, where private 
consumption accounts for about 60% of GDP, a decrease in euro area 
consumption reduces inflation and, hence, the increase in the euro area real 
interest rate is relatively strong under the ZLB. For Sweden this effect is even 
stronger, leading to a multiplier larger than one.  
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c. Fiscal multipliers for permanent fiscal shocks 
In the previous section, we have considered transitory fiscal shocks. We now 
turn to permanent fiscal shocks, which allow us to assess not only short but 
also long-run effects of discretionary changes in fiscal instruments. A 
permanent fiscal shock can be interpreted as “fiscal reform”, which 
permanently alters the fiscal structure of the economy. For instance, a 
permanent reduction in government consumption, associated with the 
reduction in labour income taxes, reduces the size of the public sector and tax 
burden of the economy permanently. Similarly, a permanent change in one 
type of tax financed by another type of tax  
represents a permanent change in the tax structure of the economy.  
Following the previous simulations, the fiscal rule is deactivated for the first 
two years. Thereafter it becomes active again and it stabilises the public debt 
and/or the deficit at their target values, which remain unchanged.   
Since the long-run response of output critically depends on the fiscal 
instrument that is determined by the fiscal rule, we compare two cases. In the 
first case, the fiscal rule is specified in terms of the lump-sum tax, 
representing the benchmark assumption typically employed in the DSGE 
literature.4 In the second, arguably more plausible case, the fiscal rule is 
instead specified in terms of the (more distortionary) households' labour 
income tax. It turns out that the choice of the instrument that serves to ensure 
fiscal sustainability is not innocuous, especially as regards the long-run 
multipliers.  
Government consumption, fiscal rule in terms of lump-sum taxes 
The first three columns of Table 5 show the short and long-run output 
multipliers of a permanent reduction in government consumption when the 
fiscal rule is specified in terms of the lump-sum tax.  
                                                 
4 See, for instance, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2011). 
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The estimated short-run multipliers are smaller than one in absolute value, 
ranging from 0.25 to 0.97 in the first year. The multipliers are generally 
smaller than their counterparts in the case of a transitory reduction in public 
consumption (see Table 1), because of the large positive wealth effect on 
households and firms. The permanent reduction in public consumption makes 
resources available for private spending on a permanent basis; this induces a 
larger crowding-in effect on private consumption and investment.  As in the 
case of transitory shocks, the multipliers are smaller in the second than in the 
first year, because nominal and real rigidities lead to a gradual adjustment of 
private demand for consumption and investment.  
The long-run multipliers are negative across all models and, with the 
exception of the Greek model, remain smaller than one in absolute value. In 
the long run, a decrease in government consumption translates into lower 
lump sum taxes for households. Since lump sum taxes or transfers do not 
alter labour supply of Ricardian households or impact on relative prices in the 
long run, lower aggregate demand due to lower public expenditures lead to a 
negative GDP effect.5      
Government consumption, fiscal rule in terms of labour taxes 
The last three columns of Table 5 show the short and long-run multipliers of a 
permanent reduction in government consumption when the fiscal rule is 
specified in terms of the households' labour income tax rate. Short-run 
multipliers are generally smaller than in the case of the lump-sum tax rule. 
The anticipation of lower future labour income taxes induces households to 
gradually increase their labour effort. The anticipation of higher labour income 
in the medium and long run strengthens the crowding-in effect on private 
demand already in the short run, leading to a lower short-run GDP multiplier.  
In contrast to the previous results, long-run multipliers are now positive and, in 
some cases, larger than one. Typically, multipliers turn positive after three to 
                                                 
5 This result is in line with earlier work by the WGEM, see ECB (2011). 
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six years. The permanent reduction in the labour tax rate leads to an outward 
shift of labour supply, providing incentives to increase employment. Higher 
employment in turn makes capital more productive. Since capital is rather 
elastic in the long run, there is a relatively large (supply-side) effect on 
production and economic activity. The largest multiplier is equal to 1.6 
(Portuguese model), the smallest to 0.1 (German model). Interestingly, the 
long-run multipliers tend to be smaller and hence economic benefits of the 
reform are smaller for those countries that have a higher import penetration, 
i.e. higher import-to-GDP ratio. Larger trade linkages imply that a larger share 
of aggregate demand is satisfied by imports.  
 
– Table 5 around here – 
 
Distortionary taxes, fiscal rule in terms of lump-sum taxes 
Table 6 shows the multipliers associated with a permanent increase in 
different tax revenues when the fiscal rule is specified in terms of lump-sum 
taxes.  
We first consider the permanent increase in labour income taxes. Short-run 
multipliers are negative and generally lower than one in absolute value, 
ranging between 0.0 and 0.8 in the first year and between 0.1 and 1.0 in the 
second year. Long-run multipliers are negative as well and in the majority of 
cases larger than one in absolute value, reflecting the distortionary nature of 
labour income taxation.  Due to the negative long-run GDP response and the 
associated wealth effect, short-run multipliers are in general larger than in the 
case of a transitory fiscal shock (see Table 2).6 The estimates of short-run 
multipliers associated with capital income taxation vary quite a lot across 
                                                 
6 This difference partly reflects the fact that fiscal rules for some models are different under 
transitory and permanent shocks, but the general conclusion about the negative wealth effect 
still holds.    
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models. In absolute values, the range goes from 0.0 for the German model in 
the first year to 2.5 in case of the Greek model in the second year. Long-run 
multipliers are unequivocally negative and much larger in absolute value than 
the multipliers associated with labour taxation. Physical capital fully adjusts to 
the new tax level, inducing a strong decline in labour and hence economic 
activity. Long-run multipliers are larger than 3 in France, Greece, Slovenia 
and Spain, and equal to or larger than 2 in the euro area, Belgium, Finland, 
Italy and Portugal.7 Both short-run and long-run multipliers tend to be larger 
(in absolute terms) for those countries in which the private investment-to-GDP 
ratio is larger and where the initial capital tax revenues are lower. In the 
Portuguese model, financial frictions amplify the negative short-run impact on 
GDP, as a deterioration of entrepreneurs’ net worth, due to higher capital 
income taxes, increases leverage and the cost of external funds (a result 
already highlighted in section IV b).  
 
– Table 6 around here – 
 
Finally, the short-run multipliers associated with the consumption tax hike are 
between 0.0 and 0.5 in absolute values, while long-run multipliers are 
between 0.3 and 0.7 (the only exceptions are Greece, whose long-run 
multiplier is about one, and Spain, whose long-run multiplier is 0.0). They are 
larger than the corresponding short-run multipliers because consumption 
habits lead to a gradual response of consumption to the increase in taxation. 
For the same reason the multiplier is usually larger in the second than in the 
first year.  
Distortionary taxes, fiscal rule in terms of labour taxes  
                                                 
7 Only Germany has a multiplier lower than one. 
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Finally, we assess the value of multipliers when the fiscal room created by the 
permanent increase in capital income or consumption taxation is used to 
permanently reduce households' labour income taxes (instead of lump-sum 
taxes). Table 7 reports the results.  
Short-run multipliers associated with a permanent increase in capital income 
taxes are somewhat smaller in absolute values than in the case where the 
fiscal rules are specified in terms of the lump-sum tax. In the case of Finland, 
the multiplier even becomes positive in the first year. The anticipation of the 
permanent reduction in labour taxation provides an incentive to gradually 
increase labour supply. This partially counterbalances the incentive to reduce 
investment associated with a higher taxation of capital. Long-run multipliers 
are again much larger than one in absolute value in most cases, given that 
investment is very elastic in the long run. As such, the expansionary effects of 
lower labour taxation compensate only partially the strong recessionary effect 
of permanently higher capital income taxes.  
Short-run multipliers associated with a permanent increase in consumption 
taxes are lower when the fiscal rule ensuring government debt sustainability is 
specified in terms of the labour income tax instead of the lump-sum tax, and in 
some cases even become positive (Estonia, Italy, Slovenia) due to the quick 
positive response of labour and the gradual response of consumption. The 
permanent reduction in labour taxes partially compensates for the permanent 
increase in consumption taxation. In the case of Estonia, the rather large 
multiplier is explained by strong  competitiveness gains due to reduced labour 
costs, combined with the fact that trade effects in the Estonian model have a 
relatively large weight in the overall dynamics.  
 
– Table 7 around here – 
 
In contrast to the capital income tax-based scenario, the long-run 
consumption tax-based multipliers are positive. Lower labour taxes favour the 
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increase in employment, counterbalancing the negative effects due to an 
increase in consumption taxes. As such, economic activity increases in the 
long run. Higher short-run consumption tax multipliers tend to be associated 
with models that exhibit a larger share of liquidity-constrained consumers and 
a higher coefficient of risk aversion.  Liquidity-constrained consumers have at 
most a limited ability to smooth consumption over time, hence their reaction to 
the consumption tax hike is large.    
 
IV. Sensitivity analysis 
Results presented so far are based on the benchmark calibrations of the 
models as described in Tables A2-A4 in the Appendix. In this section, we 
analyse the sensitivity of the results with respect to the following changes in 
the models’ calibration: 
 30 percentage point  increase in the share of liquidity-constrained 
households  
 10% reduction in the degree of price stickiness 
 10% reduction in the degree of wage stickiness 
 50% reduction in households’ risk aversion 
 50% increase in investment adjustment costs 
 
The sensitivity analysis is conducted with and without the ZLB. It focuses on 
two scenarios, a permanent reduction in government consumption and a 
permanent increase in labour income taxes. All other fiscal instruments are 
held constant for the first two years. After two years, lump-sum taxes are 
allowed to adjust according to the fiscal rules. Only a subset of models was 
used (euro area, Finland, Italy, Malta, Portugal, and Slovenia). Table A5 in the 
Appendix reports the average short-run and long-run multipliers across 
models. 
The sensitivity analysis shows that short-run multipliers become larger in 
absolute terms when there are more liquidity-constrained households, 
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reflecting the fact that these households are less able to smooth consumption 
than unconstrained households. This effect becomes exacerbated when the 
ZLB is binding. Absent the ZLB, the short-run government consumption 
multipliers are typically smaller when prices are less sticky. Firms adjust 
goods prices faster, leading to a quicker accommodating monetary policy 
response. Results are similar with regard to wage stickiness. Absent the ZLB, 
the short-run government consumption multipliers are typically smaller when 
wages are more flexible. A lower degree of risk aversion translates into a 
higher interest rate elasticity of aggregate demand so that the accommodating 
monetary policy response has a stronger effect, thereby lowering short-run 
spending multipliers. It should also be noted that the fiscal multipliers are 
sensitive to the degree of financial frictions as shown in Tables 1-9 for the 
Portuguese model. The presence of financial frictions increases in particular 
the government consumption and the capital income tax multipliers. For other 
taxes, however, these frictions seem less relevant.    
At the same time, the sensitivity of the multipliers with respect to investment 
adjustment costs differs across models, thus precluding the derivation of any 
straightforward conclusion.  
As for the permanent increase in households' labour taxes, we again find that, 
typically, having more liquidity-constrained households leads to a stronger 
GDP effect in the short run. Again, the sensitivity of the short-run multipliers to 
the share of liquidity-constrained households gets amplified when the ZLB is 
binding (in those models that exhibit an endogenous monetary policy rule). 
Another relatively robust finding is that, contrary to the permanent spending 
shocks, lower risk aversion leads to stronger output effects, and hence higher 
multipliers in the case of permanent increases in labour income taxes. It 
should be noted, however, that this result does not hold true for all models. 
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V. Comparison of model-based fiscal multipliers 
and empirical results 
In order to compare our results to those of the VAR studies, which try to 
deduce the multiplier of government spending either for single euro area 
countries or (in one case) for the euro area aggregate, some studies’ results 
are comprised in Table 8, based on Boussard et al. (2012) (with the sign 
convention used in this paper, i.e. the impact of a reduction of government 
spending by 1% of GDP). The short-term multiplier comprises the impact 
multiplier and the first four periods, whereas the medium-run multiplier 
stretches three years into the future. What is striking from those results is the 
fact that the multipliers vary quite a lot even when focusing on a single 
country. Short-term multipliers range from -0.23 to -0.7 and long-run 
multipliers range from -1.27 to 0.23 depending on the sample periods and the 
identification strategy.  
 
– Table 8 around here – 
 
Concerning tax multipliers, Table 9 provides empirical evidence from studies 
carried out for euro area countries. This table is again largely based on the 
survey of Boussard et al. (2012). It shows a large heterogeneity among the 
euro area, with differences even in the sign of the multipliers in the short and 
in the medium run. Still, except for Germany in Bénassy-Quéré and 
Cimadomo (2012), empirical estimates reveal that tax shocks usually entail 
smaller effects on GDP than public expenditure.8 
 
– Table 9 around here – 
                                                 
8 In another strand of the empirical literature, which is not based on VAR but on simple 
regression analysis, some authors find on the contrary that fiscal stimulus based on tax cuts 
are more likely to increase growth than those based on spending increases (see for example 
Alesina and Ardagna, 2010). 
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Comparing fiscal multipliers from structural models with those from VAR-
based approaches is not straightforward given that the specification of the 
fiscal shock matters significantly for the results. Furthermore, movements in 
expenditures and especially in tax revenues in empirical applications may 
consist of different expenditure  and revenue items, making a direct 
comparison to our model-based results difficult.  
Yet another problem is that the main objection raised against the use of SVAR 
models for the analysis of fiscal policy concerns the identification scheme and 
the treatment of expectations. Ramey (2011a) shows that government 
spending shocks identified following a Blanchard and Perotti procedure on 
U.S. data can be biased due to the fact that spending shocks are not entirely 
exogenous. In this case, estimated parameters and implied impulse-response 
functions (IRF) are inconsistent. 
In order to address this issue, Ramey (2011a) embeds one of her news 
variables into a standard SVAR used for the analysis of fiscal policy. It turns 
out that private consumption decreases and private investment increases on 
impact for a Blanchard-Perotti contractionary shock, but that the opposite 
result holds for unanticipated government spending shocks. A recent 
controversy (Ramey, 2011b, Perotti, 2011) highlighted that these results were 
sensitive to the inclusion of particular observations and that IRFs for private 
consumption and GDP in the two cases were probably not significantly 
different. Using European data, Beetsma and Giuliodori (2011) do not find 
significant evidence of an anticipation effect either. 
Nevertheless, with these caveats in mind, Table 10 presents a rough 
comparison of our results from structural models to empirical ones. 
Specifically, we contrast the estimates from the empirical literature with our 
short-run multipliers for transitory government expenditure and tax shocks.  
 
– Table 10 around here – 
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Table 10 shows that the empirical VAR-based literature typically finds a large 
range of short-run fiscal multipliers for both expenditures and tax items. The 
most important finding is perhaps the fact that in the empirical applications, 
multipliers can be substantially larger than one in absolute terms for both 
expenditures and tax items. Another important difference is that some 
empirical applications find a positive tax multiplier, pointing towards the so 
called non-Keynesian effects of tax shocks. In the structural models used 
here, positive tax multipliers are found only in a few cases, e.g. when the 
consumption tax shock is deemed permanent and labour income tax adjusts 
in the long run (e.g. Italy and Estonia, see Table 7). In this case, the non-
Keynesian effect arises at least partly due to the anticipation of long-run gains 
of lower labour income taxes in the future.   
 
VI. Conclusions 
We have provided estimates of the size and sign of fiscal multipliers - both in 
the short and in the long run - for European countries based on simulations of 
structural models used at the NCBs and the ECB. The heterogeneity of the 
models with regard to the specific model features and the calibration of 
parameters provided a useful environment to study the driving factors of fiscal 
multipliers. Differences in the size of the various fiscal multipliers can be 
traced back to the different nature of the fiscal shocks, as well as some 
country specific features, such as the share of liquidity-constrained 
consumers, financial frictions, and different degrees of price and wage 
rigidities. At the same time, while acknowledging the importance of these 
country differences, some of the findings are fairly robust across the variety of 
models.     
Our first robust result is that under standard monetary policy short-run 
multipliers are smaller than one in absolute terms in the vast majority of 
models, irrespective of the fiscal instrument, the considered country or the 
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nature of the fiscal shock. Temporary reductions in government consumption 
are typically associated with larger short-run GDP effects than temporary 
increases in the households' labour income tax rate, the capital income tax 
rate, or the consumption tax rate.  
The second robust finding is that a two-year long ZLB episode has relatively 
small effects on the multipliers if a temporary fiscal shock hits an individual 
country within the euro area. The reason is that cross-country spillovers turn 
out to be rather weak and the response of inflation to the country-specific 
fiscal shocks is in general rather muted. In contrast, when the fiscal shocks 
are simultaneously implemented in the euro area as a whole, the ZLB has a 
relatively strong impact on short-run government consumption multipliers, 
which can become larger than one. The same holds true for non-euro area 
countries that exhibit a country-specific monetary policy rule.  
Third, if fiscal shocks are implemented permanently, short-run government 
consumption and consumption tax multipliers are smaller in absolute value 
than in case of a temporary implementation. Long-run multipliers are in 
general negative when the budgetary room materialising after the fiscal 
tightening is used to adjust lump-sum taxes. Instead, long-run multipliers are 
typically positive if the households' labour income tax rate is reduced in the 
medium to long term. Since households anticipate these long-run GDP effects 
at the outset of the simulations, short-run multipliers are more favourable 
when the budgetary room that materialises after the fiscal tightening is used to 
lower distortionary taxes. 
Overall, our results and the review of empirical literature suggest that many 
factors affect the size of multipliers. As such, short and long-run multipliers 
can give rather different policy conclusions as regards the desirability of using 
a particular fiscal instrument. Expenditure-based fiscal adjustments typically 
have larger negative short-run effects than tax-based adjustments. However, 
in the long run, tax-based fiscal adjustments lower the long-run output 
potential of the economy, while expenditure-based fiscal adjustments can 
result in positive long-run output effects.  
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Table 1. Short-run fiscal multipliers: Temporary reduction in government 
consumption  
              
  No ZLB 2-year ZLB     
  Year 1 Year 2 Year 1 Year 2     
Belgium -0.93 -0.90 -0.97 -0.95     
Czech Republic -0.54 -0.54 -1.79 -1.57     
Estonia -0.83 -0.66 -0.98 -0.77     
Euro area -0.98 -0.91 -1.39 -1.30     
Finland* -0.78 -0.76 -0.78 -0.76     
France -0.92 -0.71 -1.05 -0.87     
Germany -0.52 -0.48 -0.72 -0.68     
Greece* -0.90 -0.73 -0.90 -0.73     
Italy -0.79 -0.67 -0.86 -0.73     
Malta -0.73 -0.49 -0.73 -0.49     
Netherlands* -0.74 -0.72 -0.74 -0.72     
Portugal*  -0.76 -0.23 -0.76 -0.23     
Portugal* (ff) -0.85 -0.37 -0.85 -0.37     
Slovenia -0.66 -0.48 -0.68 -0.50     
Spain -0.50 -0.29 -0.50  -0.29     
Sweden -0.60 -0.63 -1.63 -2.07     
* In these countries, monetary policy is exogenous. Portugal (ff) indicates the presence 
of financial frictions following Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999). 
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Table 2. Short-run fiscal multipliers: Temporary increase in households' 
labour income tax rate  
            
  No ZLB 2 year ZLB   
  Year 1 Year 2 Year 1 Year 2   
Belgium -0.04 -0.10 -0.03 -0.10   
Czech Republic -0.36 -0.40 -0.38 -0.28   
Estonia -0.21 -0.43 0.04 -0.22   
Euro area -0.11 -0.19 -0.04 -0.12   
Finland* -0.10 -0.13 -0.10 -0.13   
France -0.13 -0.30 -0.09 -0.25   
Germany -0.10 -0.09 -0.15 -0.14   
Greece* -0.50 -0.77 -0.50 -0.77   
Italy -0.06 -0.13 -0.05 -0.12   
Malta -0.09 -0.20 -0.09 -0.20   
Netherlands* -0.11 -0.15 -0.11 -0.15   
Portugal*  -0.51 -0.91 -0.51 -0.91   
Portugal* (ff) -0.49 -0.86 -0.49 -0.86   
Slovenia -0.10 -0.19 -0.10 -0.19   
Spain -0.13 -0.11 -0.13  -0.11   
Sweden -0.27 -0.31 0.56 0.88   
* In these countries, monetary policy is exogenous. Portugal (ff) indicates the presence  
of financial frictions following Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999).  
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Table 3. Short-run fiscal multipliers: Temporary increase in capital tax rate
            
  No ZLB 2 year ZLB   
  Year 1 Year 2 Year 1 Year 2   
Belgium -0.06 -0.08 -0.06 -0.08   
Estonia -0.10 -0.11 -0.10 -0.12   
Euro area -0.12 -0.10 -0.19 -0.17   
Finland* -0.10 -0.12 -0.10 -0.12   
France -0.07 -0.08 -0.09 -0.10   
Germany -0.05 -0.08 -0.11 -0.14   
Greece* -0.65 -1.06 -0.65 -1.06   
Italy -0.08 -0.11 -0.09 -0.12   
Malta -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 -0.04   
Portugal*  -0.10 -0.01 -0.10 -0.01   
Portugal* (ff) -0.19 -0.15 -0.19 -0.15   
Slovenia -0.11 -0.11 -0.12 -0.12   
Spain -0.09 -0.07 -0.09 -0.07   
Sweden -0.33 -0.50 -2.18 -3.14   
* In these countries, monetary policy is exogenous. Portugal (ff) indicates  
the presence of financial frictions following Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999). 
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Table 4. Short-run fiscal multipliers: Temporary increase in consumption 
tax rate 
            
  No ZLB 2 year ZLB   
  Year 1 Year 2 Year 1 Year 2   
Belgium -0.19 -0.43 -0.20 -0.43   
Czech Republic -0.19 -0.09 -0.15 -0.03   
Estonia -0.25 -0.08 -0.25 -0.08   
Euro area -0.48 -0.62 -0.78 -0.92   
Finland* -0.72 -0.70 -0.72 -0.70   
France -0.14 -0.23 -0.18 -0.29   
Germany -0.17 -0.22 -0.17 -0.17   
Greece* -0.48 -0.56 -0.48 -0.56   
Italy -0.29 -0.36 -0.35 -0.41   
Malta -0.15 -0.18 -0.15 -0.18   
Portugal*  -0.49 -0.38 -0.49 -0.38   
Portugal* (ff) -0.52 -0.43 -0.52 -0.43   
Slovenia -0.24 -0.25 -0.24 -0.25   
Spain -0.14 -0.19 -0.14 -0.19   
Sweden -0.17 -0.21 -1.05 -1.45   
* In these countries, monetary policy is exogenous. * Portugal (ff) indicates  
the presence of financial frictions following Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999). 
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Table 5. Short and long-run fiscal multipliers: Permanent reduction in 
government consumption 
              
Fiscal rule: lump-sum tax 
households' labour 
income tax 
  Year 1 Year 2 long run Year 1 Year 2 long run 
Belgium -0.95 -0.90 -0.63 -0.93 -0.83 0.70 
Czech Republic -0.25 -0.21 -0.43 -- -- -- 
Euro area -0.83 -0.62 -0.61 -0.46 -0.29 0.34 
Estonia -0.65  -0.61 -0.68 -0.32 -0.22 0.84 
Finland* -0.40 -0.31 -0.63 -0.33 -0.25 0.91 
France -0.97 -0.76 -0.82 -0.82 -0.48 1.28 
Germany -0.62 -0.40 -0.24 -0.61 -0.51 0.06 
Greece* -0.87 -0.74 -1.05 -0.83 -0.81 0.53 
Italy -0.68 -0.52 -0.58 -0.51 -0.19 0.54 
Malta -0.68 -0.37 -0.51 -0.62 -0.21 0.30 
Portugal*  -0.58 -0.35 -0.67 -0.62 -0.05 1.64 
Portugal* (ff) -0.67 -0.44 -0.66 -0.72 -0.20 1.55 
Slovenia -0.66 -0.41 -0.38 -0.56 -0.15 0.82 
Spain -0.57 -0.35 -0.39 -0.48 -0.38 0.31 
Sweden -0.48 -0.44 -0.60 -- -- -- 
* In these countries, monetary policy is exogenous. Portugal (ff) indicates the presence of 
financial frictions following Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999). 
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Table 6. Short and long-run fiscal multipliers: Permanent increase in 
tax rate - lump-sum taxes adjust   
                    
Tax rate: labour income tax  capital income tax        consumption tax 
  
Year 
1 
Year 
2 
long 
run 
Year 
1 
Year 
2 
long 
run  
Year 
1 
Year 
2 
long 
run  
Belgium -0.02 -0.18 -1.03 -0.29 -0.58 -2.11 -0.24 -0.49 -0.57
Czech 
Republic -0.20 -0.32  -0.11 -- -- -- -0.03 -0.07 -0.03
Euro area -0.52 -0.66 -0.87 -1.69 -2.21 -2.56 -0.40 -0.45 -0.51
Estonia -0.56 -0.65 -0.60 -0.92 -0.76 -1.25 0.00 0.01 -0.16
Finland* -0.79 -0.64 -1.48 -0.12 -0.99 -1.97 -0.47 -0.10 -0.74
France -0.28 -0.63 -1.24 -0.36 -0.61 -3.27 -0.18 -0.36 -0.61
Germany -0.19 -0.15 -0.29 -0.02 -0.11 -0.79 -0.04 -0.06 -0.13
Greece* -0.57 -0.82 -1.41 -1.18 -2.46 -3.77 -0.39 -0.58 -0.96
Italy -0.19 -0.38 -0.91 -0.21 -0.57 -2.50 -0.08 -0.15 -0.36
Malta -0.14 -0.33 -0.72 -0.06 -0.16 -1.67 -0.09 -0.17 -0.31
Portugal*  -0.47 -1.04 -1.27 -0.34 -0.45 -2.01 -0.29 -0.52 -0.66
Portugal* (ff) -0.45 -0.98 -1.27 -0.54 -0.53 -2.00 -0.28 -0.50 -0.66
Slovenia -0.26 -0.55 -1.42 -0.48 -0.77 -3.26 -0.13 -0.23 -0.54
Spain -0.12 -0.11 -0.53 -0.26 -0.45 -3.25 -0.16 -0.18 0.00 
Sweden -0.35 -0.50 -0.68 -0.43 -0.80 -1.81 -0.15 -0.21 -0.28
* In these countries, monetary policy is exogenous. Lump-sum transfers adjust in the long run. 
Portugal (ff) indicates the presence of financial frictions following Bernanke, Gertler and  
Gilchrist (1999). 
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Table 7. Short and long-run fiscal multipliers: Permanent increase in 
tax rate – households' labour income tax rate adjusts 
                  
Tax rate:        capital income tax  consumption tax     
  Year 1 Year 2 long run Year 1 Year 2 long run    
Belgium -0.29 -0.44 -1.04 -0.18 -0.35 0.53     
Czech Republic -- -- -- -- -- --     
Euro area -1.23 -1.82 -1.17 -0.09 -0.17 0.33     
Estonia -0.48 -0.64 -0.16 0.27 0.38 1.73   
Finland* 0.13 -0.91 -1.52 -0.37 -0.28 1.07     
France -0.22 -0.41 -2.43 -0.05 -0.11 1.31     
Germany -0.14 -0.15 -0.98 -0.17 -0.20 1.41     
Greece* -1.17 -2.51 -2.69 -0.35 -0.56 0.55     
Italy -0.08 -0.30 -1.92 0.10 0.20 0.66     
Malta -0.02 -0.08 -1.26 -0.02 0.01 0.47   
Portugal*  -0.34 -0.17 -0.79 -0.30 -0.36 0.58     
Portugal* (ff) -0.57 -0.30 -0.82 -0.31 -0.37 0.53     
Slovenia -0.39 -0.52 -2.36 -0.02 0.07 0.59    
Spain -0.29 -0.48 -2.79 -0.18 -0.21 0.74    
* In these countries, monetary policy is exogenous. Labour income tax rate adjusts in the  
long run. Portugal (ff) indicates the presence of financial frictions following  
Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999). 
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Table 8. VAR-based fiscal multipliers: reduction in government spending 
Studies Sample  
(Country and Periods) 
Short-term 
Multiplier 
Medium-
term 
Multiplier 
Perotti (2004) Germany (1960:1-1974:4) 
Germany (1975:1-1989:4) 
-0.53 
-0.50 
0.27 
-0.07 
Heppke-Falk et al. (2006) Germany (1974:1–2004:4) -0.62 -1.27 
Baum and Koester (2011) Germany (1976:1-2009:4) -0.7 -0.69 
Bénassy-Quéré and 
Cimadomo (2012) 
Germany (1971:1-2004:4) -0.23 0.23 
Biau and Girard (2005) France (1978:1-2003:4) -1.4 not 
significant 
Cléaud et al. (2013) France (1980:1-2010:4) -1.1 -0.5 
Giordano et al. (2007) Italy (1982:1-2004:4) -1.2 -1.7 
de Castro (2006) Spain (1980:1-2001:2) -1.14 to  
-1.54 
-0.58 to  
-1.04 
de Castro and Hernàndez 
de Cos (2008) 
Spain (1980:1-2004:4) -1.3 -1 
de Castro and Fernández 
(2011) 
Spain (1981:1-2008:4) -0.94 -0.55 
Jemec et al. (2013) Slovenia (1995:1-2010:4) -1.6 not 
significant 
Burriel et al. (2010) Euro Area (1981:1-2007:4) -0.87 -0.85 
Kirchner et al. (2010) Euro Area (1980:1-2008:4) -0.7 to -1.0 0.7 to 1.7 
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Table 9. VAR-based fiscal multipliers: Increase in net taxes 
Studies Sample (country and period)
Short-term 
Multiplier
Medium-term 
Multiplier  
Perotti (2004) Germany (1960:1-1974:4) 0.29 -0.05 
Germany (1975:1-1989:4) -0.04 0.59 
Baum and Koester 
(2011)  Germany (1976:1-2009:4) -0.66 -0.53 
Bénassy-Quéré 
and Cimadomo 
(2006) 
Germany (1971:1-2004:4) -1.17 -1.08 
Biau and Girard 
(2005)  France (1978:1-2003:4) -0.1 not significant 
Giordano et al. 
(2007)  Italy (1982:1-2004:4) 0.16  
De Castro (2006)  Spain (1980:1-2001:2) 0.05 0.39 
Afonso and Sousa 
(2009)  Portugal (1979:1-2007:4) + + 
Jemec et al. 
(2013) Slovenia (1995:1-2010:4) -0.4 not significant 
Burriel et al. 
(2010)  Euro Area (1981-2007) -0.63 -0.49 
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Table 10.  Comparing fiscal multipliers in structural and empirical models 
   Empirical*  Structural Models**       
   Min Max Min Max      
Expenditure Multipliers  ‐1.54  ‐0.23  ‐0.98  ‐0.50       
Tax Multipliers  ‐1.17  0.29  ‐0.72  ‐0.02       
 ‐ Labour        ‐0.51  ‐0.02       
 ‐ Consumption        ‐0.72  ‐0.15       
 ‐ Capital        ‐0.65  ‐0.02       
           
* Minimum and maximum values are based on Tables 1‐2, first column (Short Run) 
** Minimum and maximum values are based on Tables 3‐6, first column (Year 1, NO‐
ZLB)    
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. Models used in the simulation exercises 
    
Country Model Reference 
Belgium na   
Czech Republic g3 Ambrisko, Babecky, Rysanek and Valenta (2012) 
Estonia EP DSGE Gelain and Kulikov (2009) 
Euro area NAWM Coenen, McAdam and Straub (2008) 
Finland Aino Kilponen, Kinnunen and Ripatti (2006) 
France EAGLE Jacquinot and Lemoine (2013) 
Germany GEAR Gadatsch, Hauzenberger and Stähler (forthcoming, 2014) 
Greece BoGGEM Papageorgiou (forthcoming, 2014)  
Italy IDEA-BI-EAGLE Forni, Gerali and Pisani (2010)
Malta EAGLE Micallef (2013) 
Netherlands DELFI De Nederlandsche Bank (2011) 
Portugal PESSOA Almeida, Castro, Félix, Júlio and Maria (2013) 
Slovenia EAGLE Gomes, Jacquinot and Pisani (2010) 
Spain FiMod Stähler and Thomas (2012) 
Sweden Ramses II Adolfson, Laséen, Christiano, Trabandt, Walentin (2013) 
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Table A2. Elements of calibration 
  Belg. Cz. Rep. Estonia EA Finland
Name of the model  g3 EP DSGE NAWM Aino 
Model calibrated/estimated est. est. est. cal. cal. 
       
Open economy features      
Number of countries 3 2 2 2 1 
Number of countries in monetary Union 2 0 1 1 1 
RoW/RoEA exogenous no yes yes no yes
Tradable/nontradable goods both tr. only both tr.  tr.only 
       
Steady state values      
Private consumption-to-GDP ratio 0.60 0.59 0.60 0.60 0.62 
Private investment-to-GDP ratio 0.15 0.12 0.25 0.22 0.19 
Imports-to-GDP ratio 0.74 0.29 0.90 0.18 0.38 
Public consumption-to-GDP ratio 0.14 0.22 0.25 0.16 0.17 
Public investment-to-GDP ratio 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.03 0.02 
Public sector interest payment-to-GDP ratio 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.03 
       
Labour income tax revenues-to-GDP ratio 0.31 0.11 0.11 0.07 0.14 
Capital income tax revenues-to-GDP ratio 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Consumption tax revenues-to-GDP ratio 0.10 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.14 
    
Value of the public debt-to-annualized GDP 0.60 0.45 -- 0.90 0.60 
Value of the net foreign asset-to-yearly GDP 0.00 0.00 -- 0.00 0.00 
Annualized nominal interest rate 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Annualized inflation 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.02 
       
Calibration      
Share of liquidity-constrained households 0.00 0.40 0.00 0.25 0.00 
Coefficient of risk aversion 2.12 N/A 1.61 1.00 3.00 
Frisch elasticity of labour supply 2.08 2.84 1.78 2.00 > 2 
Habit 0.66 0.75 0.65 0.60 0.00 
Adjustment costs on investment 13.66 0.20 6.42 3.00 1.40 
Price stickiness 0.71 0.50 0.69 0.90 0.85 
Price indexation 0.59  0.27 0.70 1.00 
Wage stickiness 0.78 0.80 0.55 0.75 0.85
Wage indexation 0.90  0.37 0.75 1.00 
       
Own Taylor rule (cal. as ECBWP1195) no yes no yes no 
Fiscal rule react on deviation of pub. debt yes yes yes no yes 
Fiscal rule react on deviation of pub. deficit no no no yes no 
Fiscal rule react on deviation of gov. cons. no yes no no no 
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Table A3. Elements of calibration   
  France Germany Greece Italy Malta
Name of the model EAGLE   EAGLE EAGLE
Model calibrated/estimated cal. cal. cal. cal. cal. 
       
Open economy features      
Number of countries 5 3 1 3 4 
Number of countries in monetary Union 3 2 1 2 2 
RoW/RoEA exogenous no no yes no no
Tradable/nontradable goods both  tr. only both both 
       
Steady state values      
Private consumption-to-GDP ratio 0.57 0.62 0.63 0.59 0.63 
Private investment-to-GDP ratio 0.19 0.23 0.26 0.18 0.20 
Imports-to-GDP ratio 0.27 0.22 0.17 0.25 0.50 
Public consumption-to-GDP ratio 0.23 0.12 0.18 0.20 0.20 
Public investment-to-GDP ratio 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.00 
Public sector interest payment-to-GDP ratio 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.04 0.03 
       
Labour income tax revenues-to-GDP ratio 0.24 0.35 0.23 0.21 0.15 
Capital income tax revenues-to-GDP ratio 0.05 0.02 0.09 0.13 0.03 
Consumption tax revenues-to-GDP ratio 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.10 0.11 
    
Value of the public debt-to-annualized GDP 0.62 0.60 1.20 1.19 0.60 
Value of the net foreign asset-to-yearly GDP 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 
Annualized nominal interest rate 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.05 
Annualized inflation 0.02 1.80 0.00 0.00 0.02 
       
Calibration      
Share of liquidity-constrained households 0.25 0.40 0.40 0.00 0.25 
Coefficient of risk aversion 1.00 1.40 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Frisch elasticity of labour supply 2.00 11.00 1.00 0.50 2.00 
Habit 0.90 0.60 0.65 0.60 0.70 
Adjustment costs on investment 6.00 6.90 10.00 6.00 4.00 
Price stickiness 0.75 0.90 0.71 0.75-0.8 0.75 
Price indexation 0.75 0.45 0.27 0.50 0.50 
Wage stickiness 0.92 200.00 BG07 0.75-0.8 0.75
Wage indexation 0.50 0.75  0.50 0.75 
       
Own Taylor rule (cal. as ECBWP1195) no no no no no 
Fiscal rule react on deviation of pub. debt yes yes yes yes yes 
Fiscal rule react on deviation of pub. deficit no no no yes no 
Fiscal rule react on deviation of gov. cons. no no no no no 
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Table A4. Elements of calibration   
  Nether*. Portugal Slovenia Spain Sweden
Name of the model DELFI PESSOA EAGLE FiMod Ramses II
Model calibrated/estimated est. cal. cal. cal. est. 
       
Open economy features      
Number of countries 1 1 4 2 2 
Number of countries in monetary Union 1 1 2 2 0 
RoW/RoEA exogenous yes yes no no yes
Tradable/nontradable goods  tr. only both tr. only tr. only 
       
Steady state values      
Private consumption-to-GDP ratio  0.60 0.55 0.57 0.63 
Private investment-to-GDP ratio  0.21 0.27 0.21 0.17 
Imports-to-GDP ratio  0.33 0.61 0.27 0.44 
Public consumption-to-GDP ratio  0.23 0.19 0.18 0.30 
Public investment-to-GDP ratio    0.04 0.00 
Public sector interest payment-to-GDP ratio  0.02 0.03 0.02 0.00 
       
Labour income tax revenues-to-GDP ratio  0.11 0.23 0.07 0.29 
Capital income tax revenues-to-GDP ratio  0.03 0.01 0.02  
Consumption tax revenues-to-GDP ratio  0.43 0.09 0.04 0.16 
   
Value of the public debt-to-annualized GDP  0.53 0.60 0.48 0.00 
Value of the net foreign asset-to-yearly GDP  -0.23 -0.09 0.00 0.00 
Annualized nominal interest rate  0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 
Annualized inflation  0.02 0.02 0.00 0.02 
       
Calibration      
Share of liquidity-constrained households  0.40 0.25 0.40 0.00 
Coefficient of risk aversion  5.00 1.00 2.00 1.00 
Frisch elasticity of labour supply  0.85 2.00 match. funct. 2.98 
Habit  0.90 0.80 0.85 0.66 
Adjustment costs on investment  10.00 5.00 2.50 2.35 
Price stickiness  100.00 0.75 0.75 0.88 
Price indexation  0.00 0.50 0.00 0.16 
Wage stickiness 100.00 0.81 0,75/0,7 0.75
Wage indexation  0.00 0.75 0.50 0.34 
       
Own Taylor rule (cal. as ECBWP1195) no no no no yes 
Fiscal rule react on deviation of pub. debt  yes yes yes no 
Fiscal rule react on deviation of pub. deficit  no no no no 
Fiscal rule react on deviation of gov. cons.  no no no yes 
*Netherland's model is not a DSGE model, hence some of the data is not available. 
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Table A5. Fiscal multipliers: Sensitivity with respect to key parameters 
 
Panel A. Average multipliers across models in the first two years   
  
Baseline More 
liquidity 
constrained 
households 
Less 
price 
stickiness 
Less 
wage 
stickiness
Lower 
risk 
aversion 
Higher 
investment 
adjustment 
costs 
Government 
consumption 
-0.53 -0.70 -0.50 -0.51 -0.49 -0.54 
Gov.consumption 
+ 2 year ZLB 
-0.59 -0.81 -0.59 -0.57 -0.56 -0.60 
 
Labour income 
tax 
-0.50 -0.56 -0.50 -0.53 -0.51 -0.51 
Labour income 
tax  + 2 year ZLB 
-0.55 -0.66 -0.58 -0.59 -0.58 -0.56 
        
Panel B. Average long-run multipliers across models      
        
Government 
consumption 
-0.56 -0.63 -0.56 -0.56 -0.47 -0.56 
 
Labour income 
tax 
-1.11 -1.07 -1.12 -1.12 -1.21 -1.12 
Note: The sensitivity analysis is based on the results from the NAWM, 2 multi-country models 
and 2 small open economy models with fixed interest rate.  
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